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Creaming and parking in marketised employment services: An Anglo-German 
comparison 
 
Abstract 
 
The delivery of public services by nonprofit and for-profit providers alters the nature of 
services and jobs, often in unintended and undesired ways. We argue that these effects 
depend on the degree to which the service is ‘marketised’, i.e. whether it is subject to price-
based competition by the funder. Using case studies of British and German employment 
services, this paper scrutinises the link between marketised funding, professional autonomy, 
and service quality. Of particular concern in employment services is the problem of 
‘creaming and parking’, in which providers respond to market incentives by selecting job-
ready clients for services and neglecting clients more distant from the labour market. We 
explore three questions. First, what are the mechanisms through which marketization leads to 
the emergence of commercial providers where creaming and parking might be expected? 
Second, what are the mechanisms through which marketization puts pressure on non-
commercial providers that might resist pressures to cream and park? Third, what institutions 
might serve as a buffer for the landscape of service provision facing price-based competition?   
 
Keywords: Marketisation of employment services; quasi-markets; contracted-out public 
services; vouchers; private and nonprofit sector; front-line service work. 
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Introduction 
Across the world ‘the market’ has become a general-purpose toolbox for solving policy 
problems, and employment services – the task of moving jobless people into, or towards, paid 
employment – a much-studied site where these tools are used (e.g. Hipp and Warner, 2008; 
Jantz et al 2016). In these complex services for vulnerable clients, the policy literature often 
finds providers responding to marketization by providing only a minimal service for clients 
deemed distant from the labor market and focusing attention on job-ready clients, a problem 
known as ‘creaming and parking’ (e.g. Bredgaard and Larsen, 2008; Rees et al, 2013b).    
In the employment relations literature, these trends toward contracting and their 
consequences are examined as part of ‘New Public Management’ (NPM). Prominent issues 
include the erosion of professional autonomy and deterioration in the quantity and quality of 
staff-client interactions (e.g. Foster and Hoggett, 1999; Baines, 2004). While NPM has not 
eradicated the ethos of public service in restructured workplaces (Hebson et al, 2003; 
Rosenthal and Peccei, 2006), it has led to the devaluing of formal qualifications and exit of 
experienced workers (Ranald, 1999), put financial pressures on nonprofit organisations 
(Cunnningham and James, 2008), and spread internationally (Bach and Bordogna 2011).  
Among the tools of NPM are contracting and vouchers, market mechanisms that can 
lead to the above-mentioned outcomes. They can also have disorganising effects on collective 
bargaining and worker participation institutions, contributing (as studies in Germany have 
shown) to wage restraint and work intensification (Doellgast, 2012; Greer et al, 2013). 
Policies to mitigate them include transfer of undertakings and statutory wage rules 
(Grimshaw and Miozzo, 2009) and social criteria in public procurement (Jaehrling, 2015). 
Less understood are particular market mechanisms, or the conditions under which they have 
these effects.  
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This paper contributes to the policy and employment relations literatures, first by 
defining and operationalizing marketization in government-funded services. Second, it 
identifies two mechanisms through which it produces organizational change, including 
creaming and parking. Our first two research questions concern the mechanisms that lead to 
(1) the rise of commercial models of service provision and (2) pressure on traditional non-
profit models. Third, it explores the differences between commercial and non-commercial 
provision in Germany and Britain, which present contrasting theoretical images of 
‘coordinated’ versus ‘liberal’ political economies (Hall and Soskice 2001). We present data 
on differences between these four market segments in terms of governance, labor process, 
and whether there is creaming and parking. Our third research question concerns the effects 
of national institutions on the above two mechanisms. 
We have three main findings about these organizations under marketization. First, a 
‘commercial model’ emerges of mostly for-profit services, characterised by tight 
management control and institutionalized creaming and parking. Second, a ‘social-services 
model’ of mostly nonprofit providers declines, as financial pressures mount on organisations 
with more professional autonomy in the labour process; these organisations resist pressures to 
cream and park with varying degrees of success. Third, these effects are weaker in German 
public purchasing because of institutional supports for worker skills protected by the funder. 
In what follows, we ground our research questions in the literature, present our 
methods and data (for each of the three questions), and discuss broader implications.  
 
Marketisation, professional autonomy, and service quality in employment services 
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In employment services, creaming and parking is a kind of ‘adverse selection’ where clients 
are selected for assistance in inverse proportion to need. Lipsky (1980) observed it in his 
classic street-level bureaucracy study: front-line public-sector workers in the US sorted their 
clients because they did not have sufficient time to meet the needs of everyone in their 
caseload. When confronted with quantitative targets, they sorted clients on the basis of 
whether they were easy to serve and freed up time to hit targets by neglecting more difficult-
to-serve clients (106-107).  
Evaluations have found creaming and parking in US (Anderson et al 1993), German 
(Bernhard and Kruppe 2010), British (Rees et al 2013b), Dutch and Australian (Bredgaard 
and Larsen, 2008) employment services, but it is not universal. Studies on French 
employment services have found sorting for ‘opportunity’ (i.e. to identify available services) 
and ‘employability’ (i.e. to identify clients who can be placed in the available jobs) (Paugam 
1993; Schulte et al 2017). Under creaming and parking, sorting for employability dominates, 
with client attitudes, body language and demeanour, social status, and age used by advisors as 
signals of employability (Rosenthal and Peccei 2006). These job-ready clients are ‘creamed’ 
so providers can claim the incentive payments, while the others are ‘parked’ to minimize 
spending. This is a service quality problem, since it entails neglect of clients targeted by 
public policy, and many programme evaluators view job outcomes for clients who would 
have achieved them without intervention as ‘deadweight’ to be deducted from net effects 
(e.g. De Koning 1993).  
Quasi-markets theory, the dominant approach in the policy literature, suggests 
financial incentives as an explanation for adverse selection. Le Grand (2003) argues that 
markets for public services differ from the theoretical constructs of economists, since they are 
created by a government-purchasing agent and involve a mixture of private, nonprofit, and 
public-sector organisations. Le Grand argues that public purchasing practices set incentives, 
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and these can be used to encourage greater responsiveness of front-line workers to client 
needs (7-11).  
It is unclear, however, what kind of incentive structure would prevent creaming and 
parking in employment services. While Le Grand (2003) aims to ‘make the client king’, the 
social policy behind employment services is work-first and emphasises client compulsion 
over free choice (Greer 2015). Adverse selection is likely when the government funder pays 
for job outcomes, since it creates a material incentive to place people in jobs without payment 
for harder-to-measure outcomes (Carter and Whitworth 2015). The main architect of the 
current British employment services market acknowledged the problem in calling for the 
payment by results system to be informed by an ‘analysis of the contractual incentive 
structure to minimise “creaming” and “parking”’ (Freud 2007). Quasi-markets theory has yet 
to find the solution.  
One alternative is to view marketization as something bigger than the transaction, a 
logic of governance that includes both funding and provision. Whether they see marketization 
as a response to past bad performance of ALMPs (Sol and Westerveld 2005) or point out that 
marketization often fails to deliver on its promises (Bredgaard and Larsen 2008), much of the 
policy literature on employment services follows Considine and Lewis (2003) in defining 
marketization in terms of the overall principles of public management and the work-first 
welfare state. Jantz et al (2016) define ‘market accountability’ as ‘the organization of 
exchange via competition and contracts’ where the criteria of success are ‘price, quality, and 
return on investment’ and contrasted with democratic, administrative, and network 
accountability. They argue that these different forms of accountability are often combined: 
while the British funder uses quantitative outcome measurement while only lightly regulating 
the activities of providers, its German equivalent uses market accountability while tightly 
controlling their activities.   
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Policy literature suggests that non-commercial providers would resist creaming and 
parking. Parking hard-to-serve clients may violate the ethos of front-line workers in non-
commercial providers, as in Divay’s (2008) study of French providers, where staff promote 
‘voluntary participation of the unemployed, needs analysis, introspection . . . to help the 
unemployed to be or become autonomous’ (680). Under ‘network accountability’, where 
evaluation is dependent in part on provider reputation among local peer groups rather than 
quantitative criteria (Jantz et al 2015), this resistance would be reinforced. The task itself 
could frustrate management control through its sheer complexity (Brodkin 2008).  
But this literature also suggests a shift toward more commercial provision, in line 
with the general aim of NPM to make government behave more like the private sector. 
Providers may face financial pressures to act more like their newer commercial competitors, 
disrupting local networks that underpin the complex and customised services that they 
provide (Hipp and Warner 2008). In Australia, the market share of non-profits has declined 
considerably under competitive contracting with payment by results (cite). Furthermore, as 
this literature documents, there are commercial providers have emerged in Britain that 
impose tight performance management on staff and that have engaged heavily in creaming 
and parking, in line with expectations from governance theory (Rees et al 2014b). 
The policy literature provides many insights to the causes of creaming and parking in 
marketized employment services: the problem, the role of the transaction, and differences 
between the governance of services. But the specific features of markets that produce these 
outcomes are unclear. Our first question is: what are the mechanisms through which 
marketization leads to the emergence of commercial providers where creaming and parking 
might be expected? We address this question by examining commercial, mostly for-profit, 
providers in the two countries.  
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Key to our approach is a clearer definition of marketization, which is supplied by 
Doellgast and Greer (2017) and based on the comparative employment relations literature. 
Marketization is the introduction or increase in price-based competition in transactions. It has 
four dimensions Funders can increase frequency by ending ongoing guaranteed funding 
arrangements such as annual grants and replacing it with time-limited contracts. They can 
strengthen the price mechanism by ending cost-recovery arrangements, allowing prices to 
float according to supply and demand, and allocating contracts primarily on the basis of 
price. Funders can increase the standardisation of the service by specifying it in a way that is 
general and makes it possible for many providers to bid. Finally they can open markets to 
new players by inviting for-profit firms into provision once carried out primarily by 
nonprofits or the public sector. Below we use these four dimensions to compare the 
transactions. 
In employment relations and sociology of work, market pressures are usually defined 
diversely and at a lower level of abstraction. Marchington et al (2005) emphasise the 
introduction of new organisational boundaries in a diverse sample of workplaces; 
Cunningham et al (2013) highlight competition, prescriptive contracts, performance 
management, and reduced spending in the Scottish voluntary sector. In both of these studies, 
the market affects work by reducing the discretion of the employer and passing power to the 
funder or client (Marchington et al 2005; Cunningham 2008).   
The empirical focus in this literature is typically on change in the public or non-profit 
sectors. As Baines (2004) argues, work-first welfare reforms are conducive to the erosion of 
professional autonomy because they create ‘one-size-fits-all’ social services aimed at 
servicing the private sector and because they tend to use management by numbers, deskilling, 
and work intensification on the front line. Detailed control of white collar work using IT and 
lean management tools are widespread in the British civil service (Carter et al 2011) and US 
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municipal social services (Esbenshade et al 2016), which highlights the increasing speed of 
service. This literature also helps to explain parking by showing the reduced amount of time 
available for staff-client interaction (Foster and Hoggett 1998) and the exit of the staff from 
the sector who have the skills to address complex needs (Ranald 1999).  
This literature helps to understand workplace dynamics in non-profit and public-
sector and points to some of the dimensions of marketization. Our second question is: what 
are the mechanisms through which marketization puts pressure on non-commercial providers 
that might resist pressures to cream and park? We will examine this by examining non-profit 
and public-sector service providers in the two countries. 
Market change does not automatically translate into workplace change, however; the 
comparative literature typically explains workplace outcomes with factors external to the 
transaction, such as collective bargaining, its statutory underpinning, and its enforcement 
(Grimshaw and Miozzo 2008; Hermann and Flecker 2011), as well as strong training 
institutions and worker-participation institutions in the workplace (Doellgast 2012). Public-
sector contracting can be used to shore up such institutions, as Jaehrling (2015) argues, 
through rules that require compliance with labor standards, as is currently taking place in 
Germany.  These factors may enable strong professional autonomy in the workplace. 
But it is questionable what happens to these institutional effects when they come into 
contact with marketisation (Greer and Doellgast 2017). As studies on worker posting show, 
market change can produce uneven ‘rule enactment’ in industrial relations, producing wide 
within-country variation and gaps in workplace regulation (Wagner 2015). Greer et al (2013) 
found that the introduction of market mechanisms led to a wave of privatisation of German 
hospitals, which led in some cases to conflict and the derecognition of collective agreements 
and in others to intensified labour-management cooperation. In German employment 
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services, collective bargaining and works councils persisted in relatively protected market 
segments but were absent from highly disorganised institutions in more volatile segments 
(Greer et al 2017). This within-country diversity is one reason why studies detect no 
‘varieties of NPM’ corresponding to the typologies of welfare regimes or comparative 
capitalism (Bach and Bordogna, 2011).  
Our third question is, what national institutions might serve as a buffer for the 
landscape of service provision facing price-based competition? We explore this through a 
structured comparison of the four cases.  
Table 1 summarises the dynamics of selection, the different market conditions, and 
possible explanations and figure 1 shows how they are related in our explanation. Grey 
arrows represent the first mechanism (the rise of commercial model), black arrows represent 
the second mechanism (the strain on traditional services), and the white arrow represents 
conditions (national institutions). 
  
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE; INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Research methods 
In order to understand the effects of marketisation on workplaces, we examined a complex 
process spanning multiple organisational boundaries over a relatively long time period. 
Employment services were an appropriate context for this kind of study because they include 
a shared set of tasks but varying market structures, both between and within countries.  
	   10	  
Through eight years of field research we extended our framework beyond initial 
hypotheses and explored change over time. In keeping with case study methods (e.g. Yin 
1990), we triangulated each case through different interviewees (funding bodies, 
management, and front-line staff) and kinds of data (interviews, publicly available reports 
and statistics). In keeping with qualitative comparisons (Ragin 2008), we selected cases to 
vary on theoretically relevant conditions (ownership of provider, market arrangements, other 
national institutions) and outcomes (creaming and parking). We developed mid-range theory, 
specifying causal mechanisms repeated under specific conditions, rather than general laws 
that apply in all social reality (e.g. Hedstrom and Swedberg 1998). 
While past studies examined creaming and parking in particular countries (e.g. Rees 
et al 2013b on Britain), the issue has not been studied comparatively. We chose Britain and 
Germany to gain variation in the sample, especially on the outcome of creaming and parking. 
We expected strong between-country variation due to stronger institutions of skill formation 
and worker participation in German workplaces (Doellgast 2012) and the decline of 
administrative or democratic accountability in British employment services (Jantz et al 2015) 
and within-country variation in Germany due to the disorganizing effects of marketisation on 
these institutions (Greer et al 2013). We compare the cases along conditions and outcomes to 
rule out or qualify possible explanations.  
Our case studies are informed by 77 interviews conducted in Britain and Germany in 
2006-11, mostly managers within the funders and the providers, but also trade unionists, 
umbrella bodies, and other policymakers, mostly with one respondent. These identified the 
market segments in the two countries and the effects of competition on workplaces and 
services. Within each country, we found different funding arrangements creating different 
kinds of competition, with different provider landscapes. 
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In 2011-14 we conducted a second wave of 71 interviews in Britain and Germany, 
mostly with front-line workers and line managers, including 4 repeat interviews. We spent a 
day each in 6 establishments talking to 3-5 front-line workers (1 at a time) and their line 
managers; we also interviewed trade unionists, umbrella bodies, purchasing professionals, 
policymakers, and (in Britain) senior managers at large for-profit providers. We used 
sampling to deal with two factors that could affect the outcome: task (only job placement 
services for clients deemed distant from the labour market) and local contracting markets 
(only urban areas with large employment services sectors). Wave 2 interviews explored 
funding, the labour process, and the approach to job placement (i.e. creaming and parking). 
Table 2 describes our sample.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
We recorded nearly all interviews, typed up notes or word-for-word transcripts, and 
coded them with MaxQDA. In wave 1 we developed our key concepts, line of questioning, 
and research design; in wave 2 we had a more structured interview template and sample. Our 
concepts emerged through iterations of interviewing, coding, and discussing the data and 
codes (Eisenhardt 1989). We carried out a final ‘deductive’ top-down coding of all notes and 
transcripts using MaxQDA lexical search and coding functions to empirically assess the cases 
in terms of the categories in our analytical framework.  
In Great Britain our sample of providers changed, reflecting the market and 
organisational landscape. Wave 1 focused on non-commercial organisations – nonprofits and 
municipal departments – some small and some large, all with roots prior to marketization and 
all experiencing severe resource scarcity due to funding cuts. In wave 2 we examined the rise 
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of large commercial organisations in response to the Work Programme, which centralized the 
market after 2010 by combining most employment services schemes across Great Britain 
(Wiggan 2015) and accounted for around half of the volume of employment services 
contracting. The Work Programme became doubly important for providers with the decline 
of municipal funding and the abolition of two large regional funders. In wave 2 we 
interviewed senior managers at several large firms and then carried out site visits at 5 Work 
Programme providers (1 nonprofit, 1 municipality, and 2 large commercial organisations), 
plus 1 nonprofit not in the Work Programme.  
In Germany our provider sample reflected the more varied market structure. The 
nonprofits we visited in both waves originated in the religious charity work and labour 
movement of the 19th and 20th centuries; others originated in the ‘new social movements’ of 
neighbourhood-based activists in the 1970s and 1980s (Bode 2006). These providers had 
formed local networks, usually funded by government grants, which had been disrupted by 
the introduction vouchers for training and placement and public purchasing for others in 
2002-5. We visited 4 commercial for-profit providers operating under vouchers and 
purchasing, including two multinationals. After numerous management interviews in waves 1 
and 2, we selected 2 providers for detailed attention: a for-profit provider operating under 
placement vouchers and a nonprofit operating under public purchasing. 
In the next sections we present the British and German material, organised by 
research question. Following the framework laid out in table 1, the first two sections describe 
cases in terms of transactions, governance, the labour process and client selection; and the 
third deals with institutional regulation that could blunt these effects. 
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Question 1: The rise of commercial service models 
What are the mechanisms through which marketization leads to the emergence of commercial 
providers where creaming and parking might be expected? While collecting data we 
witnessed the rise of commercial provision under the British Work Programme (which began 
in 2010) and observed it in action with the German placement vouchers (introduced in 2002). 
Both used the price mechanism to put downward pressure on providers’ costs and used 
payment by results to focus providers’ attention on job placement outcomes. We observed 
management practices that enforced a quantitative results orientation and a work-first service 
using tight control techniques over front-line workers. Creaming and parking were evident: 
sorting only for employability, with job-ready clients served and needier clients neglected. In 
both market segments, for-profit firms dominated, although we also visited a nonprofit in 
Britain that had adopted a commercial approach.  
 
The British Work Programme. The Work Programme is for some observers the paradigmatic 
case of marketised employment services (Jantz et al 2016), and this is reflected in the way the 
transaction works. Prices, for example, were set competitively in the bidding process at the 
beginning of the scheme. The provider that won the most contracts – Deloitte Ingeus – was 
the one that had the highest price scores, i.e. which offered the deepest discounts (Greer et al 
2017, appendix b). While the government predicted an annual volume of work at £500m, in 
reality funding was roughly half that due to discounts and a lower number of placements than 
expected (NAO 2014). Bidding was in principle very open, and many of the providers had no 
experience providing employment services. Indeed most of the incumbents would become 
subcontractors of these much larger providers (called ‘primes’). Figure 2 summarises the 
structure of the Work Programme. 
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INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The centralisation of contracting was accompanied by the privatisation of the governance 
services. The government refrained from detailed specification of the services in an attempt 
to harness the potential of the private sector to innovate, giving contractors discretion to 
design services. The government attempted to avoid creaming and parking through 
‘differential pricing’, with maximum payments of £3700 to £13,700 for jobs sustained over 
two years, differentiated by client group (higher for claimants of the disability benefit 
Employment and Support Allowance [ESA] and lower for claimants of mainstream 
Jobseekers Allowance [JSA]), and through minimum service levels written by each provider 
and published online. As a civil servant told us about the previous regime, ‘contract out, but 
then tell the contractor what to do and then pay them for doing the activities rather than the 
outcome. It’s an odd way of using the private sector, really’ (manager 1, funder a, wave 2). 
Key Work Programme providers included the US-Australian consortium Deloitte 
Ingeus, UK-based welfare-to-work specialists A4e, Avanta, and Working Links, government-
contracting generalists such as the US-based Maximus and the global firms SERCO and G4S, 
and commercial not-for-profit organisations such as CDG and NCG. The eight largest 
primes, with a combined market share of 69%, were all for-profit firms operating on a 
multinational scale. Most primes outsourced 40-50% of the work to a supply chain of smaller 
organisations, while others outsourced 100% of the work (NAO 2014).  
While the funder did not standardise services, the primes did. As per the tendering 
documents, they developed sophisticated IT systems to manage staff, contractors, and clients. 
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Management interviewees at primes reported investment in proprietary software running in 
the millions during the rollout of the Work Programme (e.g. for-profit g). Competing 
organisations worked in partnership to develop these systems, and there were considerable 
similarities between our in-depth case-study organisations, nonprofit j and for-profit d. Each 
prime rolled out its ‘delivery model’ across areas as large as Scotland, Wales, or half of 
London, as per the contract specification. Some managers depicted this standardisation as the 
outcome of a long learning process: ‘A lot of our way why we’ve been successful is we have 
tested over the last ten years in reality. We know what works and it fits’ (for-profit d). Others 
viewed it as a barrier to the ongoing innovation needed to be effective (e.g. for-profit e, for-
profit h). 
The labour process of front-line workers we interviewed at the commercial providers 
was tightly constrained by management.  IT systems were used to standardise and automate 
processes and to provide detailed reports to management and staff. For-profit h used call 
centres for making appointments and gathering information needed to claim payments for 
sustained jobs. Moreover firms had discretion to cut back services, subject to ‘minimum 
service levels’, which were vague, minimalist, and varied by contractor (for the standards see 
DWP 2013; for the critique see NAO 2014).  
When a client first attended a meeting (which was compulsory and under threat of 
benefit sanction), he or she would initially be assessed using an IT tool. On this basis, the 
client would be assigned to one of three groups, usually red (distant from the labour market), 
green (close to the labour market), or amber (somewhere in between). The services provided 
were focused on finding a job and combined group interviews with employers, basic skills 
training, coaching on the job search and writing a cv, as well as online courses and job search 
activities conducted independently. This was common to all of our site visits. Interviewees 
reported difficulty referring clients with complex needs to outside services or financial 
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support for transportation or clothes for job interviews, because of a lack of funds (e.g. 
manager 3 and front-line worker 2, nonprofit c; front-line workers 1 & 2 public sector g).  
The quickness of these processes was mentioned by a number of managers and front-
line workers. One front-line worker told us, ‘I wouldn’t recognise some of [my clients] if I 
passed them in the street. In fact there was one guy starts talking to me in the lift, then I 
realised that he was my next appointment’ (front-line worker 1, for-profit d). This was due to 
the fact that, as he and his colleagues told us, the average caseload was 180-200; caseloads 
under previous contracts had been 40-50. Here, the minimum service was one contact per 
fortnight – meeting, phone call, or email – which given large caseloads was common.  
Every interviewee in this establishment saw monthly numerical targets of job 
placements as crucially important. All were aware that management could monitor their 
activities and performance in detail and in real time; and some used the IT system to 
continually compare their performance with that of their colleagues: “I always meet my 
targets. In fact, I go way past them. Then I’m looking at the guy next to me, who’s messing 
about and doesn’t care, and I’m thinking ‘why should I bother (front-line worker 2, for-profit 
d)?” Workers reported that the pressure to hit targets took time away from other tasks such as 
working as an advocates for clients with complex needs such as lone parents (nonprofit c, 
front-line worker 2) and following up with the DWP to ensure that non-compliant clients 
were sanctioned (for-profit d, front-line workers 2 & 3).  
There were small but significant differences between the for-profits we visited and the 
commercialised nonprofit k. This provider had many similarities to for-profits, including the 
sophisticated IT system to monitor staff and client activities. Targets were set at the group, 
rather than individual, level; and clients were distributed to different members of staff based 
on distance from the labour market, with the largest caseload for the advisor responsible for 
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‘red’ clients and smallest caseloads for staff involved in quick job placements. This division 
of labour was set collectively by the group (front-line workers 1-7). Their line manager told 
us that this semi-autonomy was conditional on good performance: several other locations 
were under detailed performance management by the central office due to their failure to hit 
targets (manager 3). 
Our interviewees in British commercial providers mentioned job insecurity. In wave 1 
numerous interviewees reported insecurity caused by short contracts and declining funding, 
which led to redundancies and transfers of staff (trade union A, staff 1; trade union B, staff 1 
&2; and HR consultant). In wave 2 insecurity was often mentioned in connection with 
performance management. At for-profit d front-line workers felt insecure because they had in 
the previous 18 months been through two turnovers of contracts, leading to a transfer 
exercise, applying for what was a smaller number jobs, and a stressful assessment centre 
experience (front-line workers 3, 4, 5). Another problem was punitive firing, which was a 
sensitive topic. One front-line worker discussed it openly: ‘[My line manager] is a good guy; 
you can have a laugh with him. But if you said anything you’d be out the door,’ and ‘you 
must hit targets or you’re out the door’ (front-line worker 3). Others discussed it in the 
context of other providers, as when a manager reported leaving the for-profit sector because 
‘I don’t believe in sacking people for not hitting their targets’ (nonprofit c, manager 3). 
The evaluation literature on the Work Programme points to creaming and parking as a 
serious problem, despite differential pricing (e.g. Rees et al 2013b; Carter and Whitworth 
2015). Up to March 2014 job outcome payments were claimed for 11% of ESA clients, well 
below the DWP’s forecast ‘minimum performance level’ of 22%; and providers estimated a 
decline in spending for each of these clients of 54% since 2010 (NAO 2014).  
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Our interviewees at the commercial providers did little to conceal creaming and 
parking from us. Processes were designed to select clients for employability quickly. At one 
large provider ‘red’ clients were assigned to an advisor whose caseload at any one time was 
200 – and who told us that however he intervened many of his clients would remain 
unemployable (nonprofit j, front-line worker 6) – and the others were sent to advisors 
working more intensively with much smaller numbers of ‘green’ job-ready clients (front-line 
workers 4 and 5). At a second large provider, advisors had caseloads of uniform size but had 
tightly enforced job-placement targets, forcing front-line staff to prioritise more job-ready 
clients; one worker, for example, said that an unfortunate consequence of the targets culture 
was that she would prioritise the top 20% of clients (for-profit d, front-line worker 3).  
Many workers and managers we interviewed had a matter-of-fact attitude toward 
creaming and parking. A common view was expressed by one manager: ‘you couldn’t make 
ends meet without creaming and parking’, since the Work Programme rewarded providers 
only for job placements achieved (for-profit h). Another manager summarised the 
commercial logic of creaming and parking as a mixture of a squeeze on resources brought 
about by price-based competition and the risks associated with payment by results: 
So you get less people into work, and because you’re getting less people into work 
you target, and because it’s outcome based, you’re going to target your resources at 
those people who are easiest to help. So you’re going to aggressively park and cream.  
You cream by targeting the easy ones, you park by identifying the people you can’t 
help and ignore them (for-profit e). 
This attitude, however, was not tantamount to accepting creaming and parking as positive: in 
fact, these and other management and policy interviewees expressed frustration with it and 
discussed alternatives. The manager at for-profit e argued that a more fine-grained set of 
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incentives and higher prices would create space for services for those currently being parked, 
and politician b, who was deeply committed to private provision and PbR, argued for 
separate schemes for mainstream JSA as opposed to ESA claimants.  
   
German placement vouchers. Marketisation proceeded somewhat differently for German 
placement vouchers. Unlike the other transactions in our sample, it was a voucher-holding 
client, rather than a public authority, who chose the provider. This market was open to a wide 
range of different providers and did not even involve an accreditation process. (This was in 
contrast to training vouchers rolled out around the same time and the ‘placement and 
activation vouchers’ introduced in 2012, both of which did require accreditation.) 
Transactions were more frequent with vouchers than with contracting, since they took place 
whenever a voucher was redeemed. Prices were not set according to supply and demand, but 
they were tightly squeezed: placement voucher prices were fixed by law at €2000-2500 and 
frozen in nominal terms since their introduction in 2002 up to the time of writing (2017). The 
funder did not clearly specify the service itself, although our site visit at for-profit b suggests 
that low prices created little scope for a service beyond a quick job placement. Figure 3 
summarises the placement voucher market. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
 While these providers enjoyed considerable discretion to organise services, they were 
not empowered the way that Work Programme primes were. The main providers were small 
private firms with 10 or fewer direct employees. Unlike providers under contract with the 
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Bundesagentur, their funding depended entirely on attracting voucher-holding customers. The 
introduction of training vouchers had led to a wave of insolvency by providers, who struggled 
to attract enough participants to cover their costs (for-profit a). While the placement firms 
were all creatures of the voucher scheme, they faced a similar level of uncertainty: for-profit 
a risked failing to attract enough clients or employers, which led to a focus on coordinating 
with front-line workers in the Bundesagentur to advertise its available job openings (manager 
1, waves 1 and 2). Placement vouchers constitute a small market: numbers of placements 
nationwide ranged from 50,000 to 68,000 in 2004-9 (Bernhard and Kruppe 2010), and one 
Jobcenter manager reported annual local spending of €200,000 in a city with nearly one 
million residents and described the providers as self-employed people working out of their 
kitchens (funder a, second wave).  
At for-profit b the labour process was tightly constrained: as with Work Programme 
providers there was detailed monitoring using IT systems, and the focus was on speed. One 
worker described sorting of clients through a ‘gut feeling’ acquired after 5 or 10 minutes of 
initial conversation, mainly small talk (‘Did you get here all right? Would you like some 
coffee?’); on average it took three days from first meeting with a client to job placement (for-
profit b, front-line worker 1).  
The manager made clear to us that he viewed qualified social workers as ‘the worst’, 
because they spent excessive time discussing problems with job seekers and had insufficient 
focus on the job placement (manager, wave 1). Front-line interviewees reported threats of 
punitive firing (‘arbeitsrechtliche Konsequenzen’), the frequent non-renewal of 6-month 
contracts used for new hires, and the use of low base pay (€1200 per month) plus €80 in 
bonuses per job placement to motivate staff (front-line workers 1-4). The manager was a 
strong believer in bonuses, since ‘workers on a fixed salary do their job . . . but if you’re 
working on a commission you step on it’ (manager, wave 2)! 
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At for-profit b, clients were either selected for an interview with an employer or sent 
away with a document stating that the meeting had taken place. The firm’s owner emphasised 
in interviews that this was a tightly focused job-placement service providing employers with 
precisely suited applicants (‘Paßgenaue Arbeitsvermittlung’), that any requirement to justify 
serving as opposed to rejecting applicants would impose high administrative costs. He used 
an example of a recruitment drive for an employer to show the central importance of 
selection for employability in his service: 
There were 188 candidates sent by the Bundesagentur. We had 80 people who 
showed up for interviews. . .  They could not fulfil the requirements of the job, 
smelled of alcohol, didn’t bring the application forms, were wearing jogging suits: it 
was a catastrophe. Out of these, 3 people got job interviews. The employer said, OK, 
we’ll hire them . . . The employer could see the rubbish [Schrott] sent over . . . and 
said, ‘never again the Bundesagentur.’ They would have received 188 applicants and 
had a huge task to process them (manager, wave 2).    
There was no funding available for services not directly related to the job placement, 
although this manager showed interest in emerging funding opportunities for coaching and 
internships such as the forthcoming ‘placement and activation vouchers’. Our interviewees 
had a matter-of-fact attitude toward quickly selecting clients for employability for particular 
jobs, including clients’ enthusiasm but also features specific to the job such as physical 
strength and criminal record (manager, front-line worker b). These quick sorting procedures 
identified ‘creamed’ clients to receive a service and ‘parked’ clients to be sent away.1  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Some	  evaluation	  studies	  treat	  this	  as	  ‘cherry	  picking’,	  or	  in	  German	  ‘raisin	  picking’	  (Bernhard	  and	  Kruppe	  
2010).	  Clients	  not	  ‘creamed’	  are	  refused	  service	  by	  the	  provider	  but	  remain	  on	  the	  public-­‐sector	  caseload;they	  
are	  technically	  not	  ‘parked’	  on	  the	  caseload	  of	  a	  provider.	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Summary. In this section we documented one mechanism through which marketisation can 
reshape employment services: the marketisation of funding led to the emergence of 
commercial providers. In Britain this was the intention of policymakers, and they were highly 
successful. In Germany, the aim was to overcome the Bundesagentur’s monopoly in 
placement services, but this segment remained small. In both cases, however, creaming and 
parking was part of the model that emerged. As quasi-markets theory would expect (Le 
Grand 2003), there were strong incentives for creaming and parking under PbR. Given the 
profit motive and light-touch regulation from the funder, as governance theory would expect 
(Jantz et al 2016), management in these providers had good reason to be responsive to these 
incentives. However, in the following section we will show that not all providers responded 
in this way. 
 
Question 2: The decline of established social-service models 
Our third question is, what institutions might serve as a buffer for the landscape of service 
provision facing price-based competition? We also visited established nonprofit providers 
that had undergone a transition to marketisation, but without adopting a commercial model. 
In Britain this was the transition from a diverse range of local and regional funding streams to 
the centralised and for-profit-dominated Work Programme. In Germany nonprofits had made 
a shift from grants to public purchasing in the wake of the 2003 Hartz reforms. In both cases, 
providers faced a shift away from a relatively closed arena of provision and co-production of 
services by purchaser and provider, and to opening of provision, a price squeeze and time-
bound contracts. In such traditional nonprofit and municipal providers, management control 
was looser, services more holistic, and creaming and parking something to be avoided. These 
funding arrangements put nonprofits under financial pressure: redundancies were common, 
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and managers were concerned that employment-services contracting was financially 
unsustainable. 
 
Contractors with the Bundesagentur für Arbeit. In addition to vouchers (discussed above), 
the Bundesagentur used two other transaction modes: grants and purchasing. The older one, 
grants, was retained for make-work schemes such as one-euro jobs, and covered the cost of 
services delegated to nonprofits under the principle of subsidiarity, usually church-affiliated 
social service agencies or training providers run by unions and employer associations. 
Purchasing and vouchers were more competitive ways of funding services aimed at 
increasing quality, reducing costs, and opening the market to private firms. In the words of 
one local Jobcenter manager, ‘we design services for job seekers and not for providers’ 
(funder a, wave 2).  
Under purchasing, contracts were awarded to the provider according to some mixture 
of quality and price scores, which varied from scheme to scheme. Bids could be excluded for 
being below a quality threshold or above a price threshold, set in reference to the low bid. 
Price was crucial for determining who did the work, and most management interviewees at 
providers mentioned this as a problem without us raising it. More than the Work Programme, 
the work was tightly defined by the funder. The Bundesagentur’s procurement arm – the 
Regionale Einkaufszentren (REZen) developed a catalogue of more than 40 off-the-shelf 
courses or schemes (‘Standardprodukte’) that local Jobcenters could purchase from local 
providers (funder b). The market was in principle open to a wide range of providers, with an 
online procurement platform, although the price pressure, small contracts, and continued 
local control reportedly made this a difficult market for international providers to win large 
amounts of work (for-profit providers c & d). This competition was ongoing, with contract 
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lengths between 6 and 24 months and options for extension by the Bundesagentur up to 2 
years. While local Bundesagentur managers did have some options for maintaining their 
partnerships with local nonprofits, they encouraged open competitive tendering citing legal 
principles of transparency and equal treatment enshrined in European law (funder b). At the 
end of the research, the REZen reported concluding 13,000 contracts per year worth €2 
billion (presentation, Düsseldorf 24 April 2015). Figure 4 summarises this contracting 
market. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
These providers had roots in a very different market from that of vouchers and were 
governed in a different way. Unlike the placement firms discussed above that emerged in the 
aftermath of the Hartz reforms, these nonprofits operating had longer histories. They had 
strong non-commercial identities as providers of state-funded services and actors in policy, in 
keeping with the German nonprofit ‘model’ (Bode 2003) and included some of Germany’s 
largest private employers, the Catholic charity Caritas, the Protestant Diakonie, and the 
Social Democratic Arbeiterwohlfahrt.  
Nonprofits b and h, for example, operated hospitals, nursing homes, and other social 
services alongside employment services and used make-work schemes both to maintain their 
facilities and as a funding stream. It was affiliated with a church and top managers had 
theology degrees. Other nonprofit providers were newer, smaller, and secular; they were 
often initiated by activist social workers working with women, immigrants, and disabled 
people in particular neighbourhoods. While none of the organisations that we visited had 
management systems approaching the sophistication of for-profit providers, they did 
document activities in a detailed way due to reporting requirements by the funder. This was 
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the largest market in our sample, with an annual value of around €2 billion at the time of 
research (funder b), albeit one in decline due to austerity and a decline in unemployment in 
Germany (Greer et al 2017, appendix c). 
At nonprofit b, the service was holistic and embedded in the church’s broader 
historical mission to address social needs. Joblessness was seen by the front-line workers we 
interviewed as one among many problems to address in the lives of their clients. Clients’ 
needs were assessed in two half-day sessions, and this slowness was by design. Identifying 
and addressing complex social needs takes time, our interviewees argued (front-line worker 1 
and 2). Much about this service, including assessment, referrals, and day-to-day work, was 
designed by the front-line workers themselves. Some were hostile to the idea of a one-sided 
focus on job placements, with one seeing ‘human dignity’ as a top priority in line with his 
strong Christian faith and targets a matter for management but not staff (front-line worker 2); 
another, with a background at a smaller activist nonprofit, argued that clients ‘need a lobby’ 
(front-line worker 3); another argued that a stronger focus on results would be welcome 
(front-line worker 4).  
Here, the labour process exhibited semi-autonomy. Nonprofit b recruited front-line 
workers with a university degree in social work and/or adult education (typically 
Sozialpädagogik). Advisors were responsible for advising clients, making contacts with 
employers, referring them to other services, and documenting the work; there was a 
specialised coach as well. Job-placement numbers were discussed in team meetings ‘every 2-
3 weeks and on a weekly basis when placement numbers are low’, and only in cases of very 
poor performance would managers speak to workers about hitting targets (managers 3 and 4, 
wave 2); one front-line worker claimed not to know what would happen if the collective 
target of job placements was not met (front-line worker 2). Staff told us that data entry was 
taking time away from working directly with clients, but it was not to manage individual 
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performance; one worker admitted not knowing what exactly should be entered and pointed 
out that the Jobcenter could not access clients’ files (front-line worker 1).  
Insecurity was a serious problem in the providers we visited, as it is generally in the 
sector (Enggruber and Mergner 2007; Gläser 2011). We talked with managers at a medium-
sized provider that had made one-third of its workforce redundant due to a sudden fall in 
funding (nonprofit a, wave 1) and a small provider had exited employment services when it 
lost its contract to a local nonprofit competitor (nonprofit c, wave 2). For its part, nonprofit b 
had recently reduced its front-line workforce from 10 to 4 and was employing any new staff 
were on 12-month contracts and expected the current scheme to be cancelled (managers 1 & 
2, wave 2; front-line worker 2). However there was no indication that this insecurity was used 
by management to improve performance.   
At nonprofit b, there was no creaming or parking. While there was assessment and 
sorting, it was to identify needs and appropriate services as much as employability, and there 
was considerable scope for referrals to further services (often day care for clients’ children 
[front-line worker c]). According to management, 60% of clients referred were 
unemployable, profiling was used to identify these clients and their needs, and it was not 
possible to send clients back to the Jobcenter (unlike with placement vouchers). While 
providing intensive services for needy clients was consistent with the professional ethos of 
staff and organisational model of the provider, this funding arrangement did not necessarily 
cover the provider’s costs. Management planned to exit the programme if it did not hit a 
placement rate of 20% at the end of its contract; they also estimated that 20% of their clients 
were job-ready (managers 1 & 2). 
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British non-commercial providers. In the second wave we visited three Work Programme 
contractors (a nonprofit and two municipalities) and a nonprofit not on the Work Programme. 
Compared to German nonprofits, workers’ occupational identification was weaker and the 
model of provision less coherent. Creaming and parking was reported at most of these 
providers. However, managers lacked sophisticated systems to control the work, both 
workers and managers reported having a voluntary-sector ethos (in some cases receiving 
lower salaries than they would in the commercial sector), and they sought to reduce creaming 
and parking, sometimes successfully. 
Networks of local policymakers and providers in England were weakened by the 
centrally driven marketisation process of which the Work Programme was a part (see Finn 
2015). In the first wave of interviews, prior to 2010, local managers and their funders 
described a shift away from grants to purchasing that had reduced local flexibility to fund 
small schemes: 
In the old days, funding was not competitive. It was first come, first serve. There 
would be seven-year plans, organisations would approach the council [i.e. 
municipality] with delivery plans. Eventually the money would run out, but there was 
a lot of building of capacity, showing people how to fill out the forms. There still are 
some grants, which are more flexible and get around some of the legal requirements 
around tendering. You don’t prescribe; the voluntary sector has to come up with ideas 
(managers 1 & 2, funder c, wave 1). 
In 2006-8 interviewees told us that the “usual inner-city money that the government 
kicks about that you can use” (politician a, wave 1) was on the decline, along with local 
government funding generally, and worried about the rise of centrally planned, marketised 
welfare-to-work schemes. Open competitive tendering and contracts (‘service-level 
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agreements’) that clearly specified the work had already been introduced as best practice. 
Transactions, whose outcomes were increasingly uncertain, took place at regular intervals 
corresponding to the length of the scheme or the budget cycle, 6-12 months. While local 
funders had political and policy reasons to protect local voluntary sectors – as one told us, ‘if 
it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’ (funder e, wave 1) – purchasing specified services on the open 
market increased the risk that these charities would lose their funding and providers from 
elsewhere would ‘parachute in’ without local expertise. Although payment-by-results was 
seen by local policymakers as inappropriate for clients distant from the labour market, for 
whom the job outcome was unrealistic (managers, funders b, c, and d, wave 1), it was used 
for all three of the providers we visited in wave 2, in the case of Work Programme 
subcontractors mirroring the contracts between the primes and the DWP.    
In wave 2 we looked more closely at the workplaces, which lacked both strong 
management control and professional ethos. At public sector g and nonprofits h & i, they 
were using the electronic systems of the prime contractor, which, management interviewees 
told us, took a ‘hard line’ on performance. There were individual targets, but these could be 
quite low, and there were no performance-related bonuses. In municipalities the management 
prerogative was restricted by trade union representatives and collective bargaining. At 
nonprofit c work was organised collectively by the group using improvisation. Workers told 
us they were still learning how to recruit employers to participate in the scheme, and their 
division of labour emerged from front-line workers’ pre-existing individual skill-sets rather 
than management planning or contract requirements (nonprofit c, manager 2, wave 2). At 
these providers the mix of professional backgrounds was similar to the for-profits, and two of 
the charities had recruited from for-profit welfare-to-work providers. Like the German 
nonprofits, job insecurity was reported at all of these providers as linked to the coming and 
going of contracts and not to performance management; many of our front-line interviewees 
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were on temporary contracts and spoke of their jobs as something temporary, and we heard 
many examples of redundancies due to changes in contracts.  
Although most of these providers engaged in creaming and parking, this was not in 
the context of intense management control, and providers sometimes mitigated it using other 
sources of funding. For nonprofit H, creaming and parking was reportedly a matter of 
survival for a very small provider whose employees were paid for delivering the Work 
Programme (manager 1), and at nonprofit c, creaming was built into the programme design 
set by the municipal funder with hard-to-place clients self-selecting out of the programme or 
sent back to the job centre (manager 1). At public sector c, while management and worker 
interviewees told us that the contract made creaming and parking ‘inevitable’, they mitigated 
it somewhat by funding support services through different funding streams. At public sector g 
we heard that the municipality had used its internal resources to avoid creaming and parking: 
We have given every client the service they needed, regardless of the Work 
Programme pay model. We could do this because we operated the WP in conjunction 
with a grant-based social services programme. In effect, we have subsidised the WP 
with financial resources at the county’s disposal. However, we are gradually pulling 
out of the WP by stopping new referrals (manager 1). 
 
Summary. In this section we have illustrated a second mechanism through which 
marketisation can reshape employment services, which explains why its effects are not 
uniform: the marketisation of funding led to the decline but persistence of non-commercial 
providers. In Germany public purchasing practices ran roughshod over the subsidiarity 
principle that had previously delegated social services to civil society on a non-commercial 
basis. In Britain government handed control over funding these providers to the supply-chain 
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management of prime contractors, with a consequence that they were forced to cream and 
park, depending on their particular financial situation.  
As the sociology of work literature would suggest, this puts pressure on nonprofit 
social service providers (e.g. Baines 2004; Cunningham et al 2013). In these declining 
organisations, however, creaming and parking was not universal. In Germany, this difference 
was clearest, because was managers were constrained in a way they were not in the 
commercial organisations, due to the continued occupational identity of social workers. In 
Britain there was some variation in the degree of creaming and parking due to a combination 
of weak management capacity, a sense of mission shared by managers and front-line workers, 
and in some cases constraints relating to public-sector industrial relations arrangements, and 
the availability of alternative funding streams.  
  
Question 3: Marketization and other institutional effects 
What institutions might serve as a buffer for the landscape of service provision facing price-
based competition? In both groups of providers – commercial and non-commercial – 
institutional changes developed independently of funding practices were underway with an 
aim of improving provision in the face of marketisation pressures. In Britain, managers were 
introducing a new professional body (the Institute for Employment Professionals) to 
compensate for the lack of a clear occupational identity and the resulting management 
challenges (most notably staff turnover). In Germany, managers were concerned about 
downward price pressures and wage dumping in bidding, but were divided over the most 
important institutional response, namely the sectoral minimum wage. In both countries, 
however, worker representation, whether unions or works councils, was absent from many 
workplaces. Although there were important between-country similarities – including severe 
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price-based competition – the institutions of skill formation were crucial to sustaining the 
non-commercial approach at German providers, and that these were underpinned by the 
contracting practices of the Bundesagentur.  
In British providers, the institutional regulation of work was relatively weak. In terms 
of collective bargaining and trade union presence, there was variation. At municipalities, 
some charities, and one for-profit provider with large numbers of former civil servants, trade 
union representatives were present. Trade unionists we interviewed, however, reported 
declining membership and workplace structures in the organisations where they were present 
– notably due to the turnover of contracts which led to staff turnover – and having at best 
aborted campaigns at the far more numerous firms where they had no structures (trade union 
a, staff 2-3, wave 2). Activists reported having little influence over pay and bemoaned a lack 
of information, even where they were present, and reported servicing as more important (lay 
officials 2 &3); this was confirmed by management (for-profit d, manager 1). 
For managers in the sector, however, the weak institutional regulation of work was a 
problem. One study carried out by the sector’s umbrella body found that managers tend to see 
worker turnover as excessively high and perceive the lack of a clear track of career 
progression within the sector as one reason (Crawford and Perry 2010). The most common 
qualification for workers we interviewed was NVQ level 3 in Information, Advice and 
Guidance. This was not mandated by the funder, and staff were recruited from an extremely 
wide range of fields, including local government, retail sales, high-street recruitment 
agencies, the civil service, and the voluntary sector, including university graduates in 
psychologists and social work and former clients with unrelated qualifications.  
A management-driven initiative to address this problem, the Institute for Employment 
Professionals, was nascent at the time of research, but according to management interviewees 
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was having success in attracting members and designing a new curriculum for skills specific 
to the sector (for-profit h, umbrella d). It was difficult, however, to build support in the sector 
for this initiative, in part due to differences of opinion between managers as to whether 
formal qualifications would necessarily produce employees capable of hitting job targets. 
One of Crawford and Perry’s (2010) management respondents put the case against 
occupational regulation succinctly: ‘It’s important to remember this is a performance-driven 
industry: the best performing [personal assistant] may not be the most well qualified’ (20).  
In Germany, we observed two market segments with different governance, 
workplaces and kinds of services. Small companies operating under placement vouchers had 
a similar amount of discretion to Work Programme providers and lacked contracts specifying 
the work in detail. The mixture of occupational backgrounds at for-profit b was similar to 
Work Programme prime providers: former clients, job centre staff, and sales occupations 
(manager, front-line workers 1-3). Similarly, for-profit a employed trainers with occupational 
backgrounds, and hourly pay, in the areas in which they taught (manager, wave 1). For-profit 
a reported having too few directly employed employees to be covered by the works council 
law, since it relied extensively on freelance teachers (management), and none of the for-
profits we visited were bound to collective agreements. 
Under purchasing, by contrast, providers tended to employ qualified social workers 
that had some form of worker representation. The contractor we examined in depth was 
operating under payment by results while exhibiting very strong professional autonomy in the 
workplace. Workplace-level worker representatives did exist in this and most other providers 
we visited operating under contracts with the Bundesagentur, with their roles defined in law. 
But their roles were restricted by the particular legal framework for trade union activities in 
German nonprofits (especially those covered by church law) and because staff turnover made 
it difficult to maintain trade union influence in the workplace outside the public sector (trade 
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union b, staff 1-3). Moreover, the funder had decided not to stipulate adherence to collective 
agreements or wage minima in tendering processes, citing legal principles of autonomous 
collective bargaining and inter-regional differences in labour markets (wave 2, funder b).  
The funder, however, did often stipulate professional qualifications in the 
specifications of work being tendered, which our REZ interviewees saw as a way to limit 
wage dumping: in their view providers could not recruit qualified social workers for 12 euros 
per hour (ibid). Although prescribing staff qualifications, experience, and numbers in the 
tender specification was taken for granted by most interviewees, it was cited as an important 
difference between contracting in Germany and Great Britain by the international providers 
we visited (for-profits c & d). Management at for-profit d brought this issue up immediately 
when we asked at the beginning of the interview about how they entered the sector. The 
formal qualifications of workers, 
depend on the position and the scheme. In Germany it is much stricter in the tender 
specifications which qualification staff have to have. I have learned that in Britain you 
are allowed to employ whoever you want to – the main thing is you find people jobs 
in the labour market. Here [in Germany] you need a social work background or a 
completed apprenticeship and certain years of professional experience (manager 1). 
This did not stop downward pressure on wages (Gläser 2010), but it did matter for the 
work. Management lacked the discretion to replace qualified social workers with a diverse 
mixture of results-oriented individuals, because the tender specification did not permit it. As 
we saw above, qualified social workers tended to resist pressures to cream and park; in many 
cases they also disagreed with the work-first orientation of social policy. 
The non-market institutions that explain the differences between the German 
nonprofit Bundesagentur contractor and other organisations subject to marketised funding are 
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the arrangements governing worker skills well-known in comparative industrial relations; 
nevertheless, our picture does not correspond to the image of liberal Britain versus 
coordinated Germany (Hall and Soskice 2001). As recent literature on German industrial 
relations would expect (Doellgast 2012), persistent institutional effects led to within-country 
differences, with some providers – especially traditional nonprofits – embedded in these 
traditional institutional frameworks. At other providers, however, we observed employers 
outside of the institutions of collective bargaining, workplace participation, and skill 
formation; by all accounts this is ubiquitous among the small providers operating under 
placement vouchers who face a far more volatile market than their larger British counterparts. 
Our findings confirm Jaehrling’s (2015) argument that contracting arrangements matter, since 
the funder required contractors to employ qualified social workers; such requirements were 
absent from British Work Programme contracting and German placement vouchers.   
 
Conclusion 
Above we examined the causes of creaming and parking in marketised employment services. 
Tight price-based competition was used by funders in both countries. We observed creaming 
and parking all of the Work Programme ‘prime contractors’ (for profits and a nonprofit) and 
the German placement vouchers (a for-profit firm). It was absent, however, from the German 
contractor (a large nonprofit), and Work Programme subcontractors tried with varying 
degrees of success to avoid it (municipalities and a nonprofit). Table 3 summarises the 
differences between the cases along the conditions and outcomes presented in table 1. While 
these findings are not representative of all workplaces in these countries, they do suggest new 
ways to explain and interpret variation and change in government-funded services.  
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INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Our first contribution is to provide a definition and operationalisation of marketisation 
that can be applied more generally to studies of government-funded services. The governance 
approach to marketisation focuses on principles and is non-specific regarding practices, while 
sociology of work and comparative employment relations approaches uses ad hoc and 
context-specific definitions. Our definition of marketization (building on Doellgast and Greer 
2017), by contrast, specifies generic but concrete features of transactions – frequency, 
openness, standardisation, and the price mechanism – that could cause change in services and 
workplaces in diverse contexts. One contribution of this paper is to show qualitatively the 
workings of transactions along these dimensions. 
Our second contribution is to identify two mechanisms through which marketization 
produces the kind of organizational change that might affect service quality, in this instance, 
creaming and parking. Our main theoretical insight here is that marketisation effects are not 
determined by the incentives set by funders (Anderson et al 1993, Le Grand 2003), but that 
different kinds of organisations will respond to incentives in different ways. We therefore 
assume that the mechanisms are different for commercial and non-commercial providers. Our 
first research question concerns commercial providers and draws on governance theory 
(Considine and Lewis 2003, Jantz et al 2016). We find that marketisation led to the rise of 
new forms of commercial provision characterised by tight management control and work-first 
services, and therefore prone to creaming and parking. Our second research question 
concerns pressures on non-commercial providers, drawing on the labour process tradition 
(Baines 2004, Cunningham et al 2013, Esbenshade et al 2016). We find that marketisation 
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corroded existing non-commercial forms of provision characterised by strong professional 
autonomy and often resistant to creaming and parking.  
Our third contribution concerns empirical differences between these commercial and 
non-commercial providers in Germany and Britain. Drawing on comparative employment 
relations (Doellgast 2012, Greer et al 2013, Jaehrling 2015), we explore the consequences of 
institutional differences on the effects of marketization in these providers. We find that 
commercial organizations in the two countries responded to broadly similar market 
conditions similarly, including engaging in creaming and parking. We also find in both 
countries differences between commercial and non-commercial organizations, and find non-
profits in both countries resisting pressures to become more like profit-making firms (albeit 
under severe financial pressure that calls into question sustainability). German nonprofits had 
the strongest resistance to marketization pressures, not because of any automatic national-
institutional effect (these institutions did not constrain providers operating under voucher 
schemes), but because the purchaser had structured the transaction in a way that shored up 
institutional supports for professional skills. The devaluation of professions by NPM tools 
(cites) is, we show, powerful but works in varying ways depending on institutional 
differneces and the exact workings of the transaction.  
The lines of the policy debate over marketisation are between economists and 
policymakers who see great potential (Le Grand 2003, Freud 2007) and critical researchers 
who show that it does not in practice deliver (Davies 2008, Bredgaard and Larsen 2008). Our 
explanation points beyond this debate by pointing to organisational reasons why 
marketisation often does not deliver.  
Our findings suggest that policymakers cannot solve service quality problems merely 
by adjusting incentives. What is needed may be both a change in the kind of contractors and a 
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strengthening of the professional autonomy of staff. But cancelling contracts, rebuilding the 
non-profit sector, and reforming funding practices to support high-quality services could pose 
financial, political, and legal difficulties. 
More straightforward may be what we observe in Germany: the regulation of 
contractors through the prescription of workplace standards in contracts. Our interviewees in 
German nonprofits could point to many problems that funding practices caused for them. The 
level of detail in which the work was prescribed created a huge administrative burden 
shouldered by front-line workers and sapped their capabilities to innovate. The 
standardization of services also made it easier for the funder to compare offers and extract 
low prices, contributing to problems both of low pay and job insecurity (which the funder 
refrained from regulating). Nevertheless, whichever providers carried out these schemes had 
to employ qualified social workers, whose occupational ethos frustrated tight management 
control and made creaming and parking a difficult prospect.  
One limitation of our study is that the problems discussed above do not exist in every 
government-funded service subject to marketization, and there are many conditions under 
which creaming and parking might appear that we have not consider. There is less scope for 
creaming where the outcome is difficult to measure, as in many training courses or services 
for people very far from the labour market, or where the clientele is less diverse, as in a job-
placement schemes for lone parents, and there is consequently less scope for sorting. But 
creaming and parking exist in other kinds of marketised services with measurable outcomes, 
incentives to achieve them, and the sorting of service users, such as schools and health 
services. Future research could assess the conditions under which our two mechanisms 
appear, in employment services and beyond. 
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A second limit concerns the effects of marketisation on service outcomes. We do not 
merely mean income, employment, and benefit payment, which in the aggregate are affected 
by marketisation and privatisation only in small and highly mediated ways (Krug and 
Stephan 2016) or the effects of payment by results on performance for disadvantaged job-
seekers being ‘parked’. The main outstanding question is: how does ‘creaming’ affect the 
kinds of jobs and employer strategies for recipients of mainstream job-seekers benefits for 
those deemed job-ready (Greer 2016)? Understanding the signalling function of front-line 
workers in marketized employment services would illuminate the role of welfare reform in 
structuring inequality in present-day societies.   
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Table	  1.	  Three	  propositions	  on	  marketisation	  and	  effects	  
	  
	  	   Commercial	  model	   Noncommercial	  social	  services	  
	  
Selection	  of	  clients	   Only	  employability	  
Job-­‐ready	  clients	  identified	  and	  
served	  and	  neglect	  of	  more	  needy	  
clients	  (creaming	  and	  parking)	  
Employability	  and	  opportunity	  
Job-­‐ready	  clients	  identified	  and	  
served;	  more	  needy	  clients	  referred	  
to	  services	  
	  
1. The	  transaction	  
2. (Le	  Grand	  2003,	  Greer	  
and	  Doellgast	  2017)	  
Emerge	  under	  marketisation	  
Open	  competition	  
Clear	  prescription	  
Strong	  price	  mechanism	  
Frequently	  recurring	  transactions	  
Emerge	  under	  non-­‐market	  funding	  
Closed	  networks	  
Co-­‐production	  of	  services	  
Price	  not	  decisive	  
Provision	  uninterrupted	  by	  
transactions	  
	  
Propositions	  
3. Governance	  	  
4. (Considine	  and	  Lewis	  
2013,	  Jantz	  et	  al	  2016)	  
Market	  principles	  
Commercial	  providers,	  including	  
for-­‐profit	  
Accountability	  through	  quantitative	  
measurement	  of	  results	  
Narrowly	  defined	  work-­‐first	  services	  
Nonmarket	  principles	  
Traditional	  nonprofits	  and	  municipal	  
providers	  
Accountability	  through	  qualitative	  
assessments	  	  
Services	  for	  broadly	  defined	  needs	  
	  
P1:	  Marketisation	  encourages	  the	  rise	  of	  new	  forms	  of	  commercial	  provision…	  
5. The	  labour	  process	  	  
6. (Baines	  2004,	  Vidal	  2013)	  
Tight	  management	  control	  
IT	  systems	  used	  to	  manage	  
performance	  
Deskilling	  
Speedup	  of	  work	  
Punitive	  firing	   	  
Professional	  autonomy	  
IT	  systems	  used	  for	  reporting	  and	  
procedure	  
Formal	  qualifications	  valued	  
Slow	  processes	  
Layoffs	  at	  contract	  end	  
	  
P2:	  Marketization	  puts	  pressure	  on	  an	  established	  social	  service	  model…	  
7. 3.	  National	  institutions	  	  
8. (Doellgast	  2012,	  
Jaehrling	  2015)	  
Liberalization	  
Weak	  limits	  to	  management	  
discretion	  
Strong	  non-­‐market	  institutions	  
Management	  discretion	  limited	  by	  
skills	  frameworks	  or	  industrial	  
relations	  institutions,	  underpinned	  
by	  contracting	  rules	  
	  
P3:	  These	  effects	  are	  weaker	  where	  strong	  non-­‐market	  workplace	  institutions	  are	  in	  force…	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Table	  2.	  Interviews	  and	  interviewees	  
	  
Great-­‐Britain	  Wave	  1:	  2006-­‐2011	  (51	  interviews)	   	   Wave	  2:	  2011-­‐14	  (51	  interviews)	   	  
Code	   Note	   Interviewees	   	   Code	   Note	   Interviewees	  
Funder	  A	   DWP	   2	  managers	   	   Funder	  A	   DWP	   2	  managers	  
Funder	  B	   Regional	  Development	  
Agency	  
2	  managers	  	   	   Providers	   	   	  
Funder	  C	   Local	  authority	   3	  managers	  	   	   Public	  sector	  G	   Local	  authority	  subcontractor	  on	  
Work	  Programme	  (WP)	  
2	  managers,	  	  
4	  front-­‐line	  staff	  
Funder	  D	   Job	  Centre	  Plus	  (JCP)	   1	  manager	   	   Public	  sector	  H	   Local	  authority	  subcontractor	  WP	   	  1	  manager	  
Funder	  E	  
Learning	  and	  Skills	  
Council	  
1	  manager	   	   Nonprofits	  H	  &	  I	   Local	  charity	  subcontractor	  WP	   	  1	  manager	  each	  
Funder	  F	   Welsh	  Assembly	  
Government	  
1	  manager	  	   	   Nonprofit	  J	   Large	  charity	  subcontractor	  WP	   	  1	  manager	  
Providers	   	   	   	   Nonprofit	  C	   Charity	  not	  on	  WP	   3	  managers,	  	  
5	  front-­‐line	  staff	  
Public	  sector	  A	   JCP	   3	  managers	   	   Nonprofit	  K	   Large	  charity	  prime	  provider	  WP	  
3	  managers,	  	  
7	  front-­‐line	  staff	  
Public	  sector	  B	   Local	  authority	  	   1	  manager	  
4	  front-­‐line	  staff	  
	   For-­‐Profit	  D	   Multinational	  prime	  provider	  WP	   3	  managers,	  	  
4	  front-­‐line	  staff	  
Public	  sector	  C	   Local	  authority	   2	  managers	   	   For-­‐Profits	  E-­‐H	   Multinational	  prime	  providers	  WP	   I	  manager	  each	  
Nonprofit	  A-­‐D	   Charity	   1	  manager	  each	   	   Others	   	   	  
Nonprofit	  E	   Charity	   7	  front-­‐line	  staff	   	   Politician	  B	   1	  member	  of	  Parliament	  with	  researcher	  
Others	   	   	   	   Umbrella	  D	   Spokesperson	  for	  the	  Employment	  Related	  Services	  
Association	  
UK	  Treasury	   2	  managers	   	   Trade	  union	  A	   Public	  and	  Commercial	  Services	  Union.	  4	  staff,	  3	  lay	  
officers	  
Politician	  A	   1	  member	  of	  parliament	   	   Consultancy	   1	  manager	   	  
Cabinet	  Office	   1	  manager	   	   	   	   	  
Umbrella	  A-­‐C	   Infrastructure	  bodies	  for	  the	  voluntary	  
sector,	  1	  manager	  each	  
	   	   	   	  
TUC	   3	  policy	  officers,	  1	  UnionLearn	  staff	   	   	   	   	  
Trade	  union	  A	   3	  staff,	  1	  lay	  official	  at	  UNISON	   	   	   	   	  
Trade	  union	  B	   4	  staff	  at	  AMICUS	   	   	   	   	  
Consultant	   1	  human	  resources	  consultant	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Germany	  Wave	  1:	  2006-­‐2011	  (26	  interviews)	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Wave	  2:	  2011-­‐14	  (20	  interviews)	  
Funder	  A	  
Local	  Jobcenter	  /	  
municipality	  
2	  managers	   	   Funder	  A	   Local	  Jobcenter	   1	  manager	  
Providers	   	   	   	   Funder	  B	  
Regionales	  Einkaufszentrum	  
(REZ),	  BA	  
2	  managers	  
Public	  sector	  A	  
Bundesagentur	  für	  
Arbeit	  (BA)	  
2	  works	  councilors	   	   Providers	   	   	   	  
Public	  sector	  B	   Local	  Jobcenter	  
1	  manager	  
3	  works	  councilors	  
	   Public	  sector	  C	   Jobcenter	   1	  manager	  	  
Nonprofits	  A,	  B,	  C,	  G	   Association	   2	  managers	  each	   	   Nonprofit	  B	   Large	  charity	  BA	  contractor	  
2	  managers,	  	  
4	  front-­‐line	  staff	  
Nonprofit	  D	   Association	   2	  works	  councilors	  	   	   For-­‐profit	  B	  
Small	  firm	  operating	  under	  
placement	  vouchers	  
2	  managers,	  5	  
front-­‐line	  workers	  
Nonprofit	  E,	  F	   Association	   1	  manager	  each	   	   For-­‐profits	  C	  &	  D	   Multinational	  firms	   1	  manager	  each	  
For-­‐profits	  A	  &	  B	   Small	  firms	   1	  manager	  each	   	   Nonprofits	  C	  &	  H	   Small	  charities	  BA	  contractors	   1	  manager	  each	  
Others	  
Parliament	  
	  
1	  SPD	  researcher	  
	   	   Other	   	  
Trade	  union	  A	   2	  IG	  Metall	  staff	   	   	   Umbrella	  A	  
1	  manager	  at	  Deutscher	  Paritätischer	  
Wohlfahrtsverband	  
Trade	  union	  B	   3	  ver.di	  staff	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Table	  3.	  Summary	  of	  the	  cases	  
	   	  
Organisational	  model	   Commercial	  
	  
Non-­‐Commercial	  
Market	  segment	   British	  WP	  
Primes	  
German	  Job	  
Placement	  Vouchers	  
British	  WP	  
Subcontractors	  
German	  	  BA	  
Contractors	  
Organisations	   Nonprofit	  and	  	  
for-­‐profits	  
For-­‐profit	   Small	  nonprofits	  
and	  municipalities	  
Large	  nonprofit	  
Client	  selection	  
Employability	   H	   	   H	   H	   H	  
Opportunity	   L	   	   L	   H/L	   H	  
Governance	  principles	  of	  funder	  
Commercial	  orientation	  of	  
providers	  
H	   	  	   H	   L	   H/L	  
Work-­‐first	  approach	   H	   	   H	   H/L	  	   H/L	  
Quantitative	  results	  
orientation	  
H	  
	  
	   H	   H	  
	  
H	  
Labour	  process	  at	  provider	  
Individual	  targets	  used	   H/L	   	   H	   L	   L	  
Deskilling	   H	   	   H	   H	   L	  
Speed	  of	  processes	   H	   	   H	   H/L	   L	  
Punitive	  firing	   H/L	   	   H	   L	   L	  
National	  institutions	  
Importance	  of:	  
Worker	  representation	  and	  
collective	  bargaining	  
H/L	   	   L	   H/L	   H	  
Formal	  qualifications	   L	   	   L	   L	   H	  
L	  =	  low,	  H	  =	  high,	  H/L	  =	  mixed.	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
	   46	  
	  
	   47	  
	  
